No specific cases have been examined in this article, but Table 1 contains indicative cases to date. In addition, the IAEA is currently investigating serious and clear violations of Syria`s security measures, including the construction of an unreported reactor and the non-declaration of nuclear materials. At the time of the letter, Syria refused to cooperate with IAEA requests for access to a number of suspicious locations. Board members and other readers can benefit from the analysis of the Syrian case using the factors described in this article. Article XII.C provides that the chamber “… In Part 18 of INFCIRC/153, the Chamber states that “a state measure is essential and urgent to verify nuclear materials… is not redirected to nuclear weapons… Committee can ask the state to take the necessary measures without delay.” Whether governments believe that a state`s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful is a judgment that is not based on security, but on the balance of probabilities. A judgment on non-compliance cannot wait until the state has succeeded in acquiring the nuclear weapon. If the level of evidence is too high, the IAEA will not give in to its responsibility to alert the international community in time.
4. Although it was clear in 2003 that Iran was not compliant, concern about the consequences of a finding of non-compliance (. For example, if Iran were to stop cooperating with the IAEA or even leave the NPT and the Security Council could agree in any event) resulted in a three-year delay in non-compliance with the rules, while efforts were made to negotiate a solution with Iran. In these circumstances, it is then up to the State to prove that non-peaceful purposes are not envisaged. It can try to achieve this by cooperating fully with the IAEA and ensuring transparency. IAEA mechanisms to ensure compliance with NPT guarantees Article XII.C also provides that “it notifies inspectors of any breaches of any breaches of the Director General and the Board of Governors.” Article XII.C obliges the Committee to report non-compliance to the Security Council.  The non-compliance process is an important aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) security system and the only mechanism established to determine non-compliance with the non-proliferation treaty. Failure to comply with a NPT protection agreement constitutes a violation of Article III of the NPT, the obligation to adopt security measures for all nuclear materials and, depending on the circumstances, a possible violation of Article II, the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons.